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At the completion of this learning module, the student will be able to do the following: 
 
• Identify the three legal regimes governing operations in cyberspace 
• Describe the fundamental aspects of the law enforcement paradigm, including its 
primary strengths and weaknesses in dealing with cyber intrusions 
• List the types of computer crimes 
• Explain the general bases for limiting search and seizure by government, 
including the requirement for a search warrant the exceptions to this rule 
• Explain the concept of “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
• Describe limits on workplace searches, distinguishing them from other searches 
• Explain the general bases for government surveillance 
• List the requirements of, and the exceptions to, the Wiretap Act and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act 
• Describe the nature of entrapment 
• Describe the fundamental aspects of the intelligence collection paradigm, 
including its primary strengths and weaknesses 
• List the requirements for “U.S. Person” status 
• Describe the fundamental aspects of the military operations paradigm, including 
its primary strengths and weaknesses 
• Identify the two primary legal questions in the military operations paradigm 
• Explain the origin of the Schmitt Analysis, its seven criteria, and the process by 
which it resolves jus ad bellum questions 
• List and define the four customary principles of the law of armed, explaining how 
each applies to operations in cyberspace 
• Describe the applicability of air law, space law, and the law of the sea to cyber 
intrusions 
• Distinguish homeland defense from homeland security 
• Briefly explain the basis for the doctrine of posse commitatus 





There are three legal paradigms through which to characterize computer intrusion.  These 
paradigms overlap each other.  In addition, an intrusion can fit into any two or all three of 
the paradigms.  They are: 
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• Law Enforcement 
- almost all computer intrusions can be dealt with under this paradigm 
- there are two levels of domestic legal authorities:  federal and state statutes 
- there is an evolving body of international criminal law 
- LE can be applied to most threats, but is not effective against all threats 
- LE also involves strict evidence-collection rules which limit potential 
defensive responses 
- In addition to government criminal sanction (prison time/fines; beyond a 
reasonable doubt), numerous civil remedies (damages; preponderance of 
evidence(lower standard)) exist for government and private individuals 
 
• Intelligence collection 
- intelligence operations may only be conducted against non-U.S. persons 
- after this categorical determination, almost nothing can be collected on 
U.S. persons and almost anything can be collected on non-U.S. persons 
- a U.S. person is a U.S. citizen, a resident alien, a U.S. corporation, or an 
organization composed substantially of Americans. 
 
• Military operations 
- only those intrusions that may be characterized, either independently or in 
conjunction with other such actions, as a use of force under international 
law or are part of an ongoing conflict may be dealt with militarily 
- posse comitatus is complex legal doctrine but it does permit domestic 
military operations (homeland defense v. homeland security) 
- two primary questions in this field: 
 Are we at war? 
• UN Charter paradigm 
• Schmitt Analysis 






The legal challenge in any computer intrusion is properly characterizing the intruders’ 
categorical legal identity.  This will determine whether one or more of the above 
paradigms are applicable.  Each as has strengths, weaknesses, and limitations.  Each 






Law Enforcement is the most ubiquitous of the three legal approaches to 
intrusions in cyberspace.  It is based in the domestic law of the country which suffers the 
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intrusion, and is intended to deal with intruders as individuals or, at most, small 
conspiracies of a few people.  The law enforcement paradigm in the United States is one 
of patient, painstaking evidence collection under tight constitutional and statutory 
limitations.  Presumptions favor the accused, and investigations are undertaken with an 
eye toward prosecution and incarceration.  It may operate against U.S. citizens, non-
citizens within U.S. control, or citizens of other countries having extradition agreements 
with the U.S.  Such agreements are possible only when each state party has a domestic 
law criminalizing the same behavior. 
 
The strengths of this approach are the clarity of its rules and (relative) certainty of 
its processes.  It provides a highly transparent means by which to identify and sanction 
bad actors in cyberspace, and allows for highly individualized treatment in different 
cases.  The weaknesses include the slow pace of investigation (especially at the federal 
level), the need to apprehend the accused, and the advantage to which an intruder may 




Computer crimes fall into two broad categories:  those with a target in cyberspace, 
and those which merely employ computers as a means toward a more traditional criminal 
end.  The first type includes attacks on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information or systems.  These crimes also include the theft of computer-stored 
information or cyber-based services.  Computer intrusions of this type include: 
 
• Damaging computer systems 
• Trespassing 
• Threatening damage 
• Impairing the integrity and confidentiality of a network 
 
Theft of information usually involves one of three categories: government (military of 
law enforcement), business information (trade secrets or confidential information, such as 
business plans), and financial information (account numbers and electronic fund 
transfers).  Theft of services may include “phreaking” (penetration of a telephone 
switching system to steal long-distance calling services), stealing passwords, or 
establishing shell accounts.  The second type, in which the computer is an instrumentality 
of the crime, includes gambling, child pornography, espionage, stock fraud, bank fraud, 
and copyright piracy. 
 
Search and Seizure 
 
The law dealing with government search and seizure begins with the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
                                                 
1 This section is based upon the work of Clement McGovern of the U.S. Department of Justice Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, included in his presentation Searching and Seizing Computers and 
Electronic Evidence. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be infringed, and no Warrants shall issue without 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched an the persons or things to be seized. 
 
Government searches, then, may be undertaken when: 
 
• A warrant has issued,  
• Government conduct does not violate the a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, or 
• A specific exception to the warrant requirement applies. 
 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
Reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) contains subjective and objective 
prongs.  A person has a REP when his conduct reflects an actual subjective expectation of 
privacy, and that expectation is objectively reasonable under society’s expectations.  In 
U.S. v. Katz and subsequent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court found REP in homes, phone 
booths, and opaque containers, but not in garbage, public activities, or a stranger’s home.  
These examples have provided the basis for analogies in cyberspace, particularly the 
search of e-mail.  Messages may be stored on the sender’s system, on the recipient’s e-
mail server, or on the recipient’s own machine.  REP may be lost id one relinquishes 
control of one of these systems to a third party, such as a repair shop or a friend.  Fourth 
Amendment protections apply only vis-à-vis the federal government (or, though the 
Fourteenth Amendment, state and local governments) and do not restrict private searches, 
so long as the private party is not acting as an agent of the government.  The presence of 
REP in opaque containers extends to the information stored in computer systems, 
including hard drives, personal digital assistants, and pagers. 
 
Exceptions to the warrant requirement include: 
 
• Consent 
• Exigent circumstances 
• Plain view 
• Search incident to lawful arrest (SITA) 
• Inventory search 
• Border search 
• Private party search 
 
When an individual grants consent, the scope of that consent is a key question.  
The test, established in the Supreme Court case Florida v. Jimeno, is what a reasonable 
person listening to the granting of consent would think.  This test is highly fact-specific 
and varies from situation to situation.  To avoid future questions regarding the scope of 
consent. Law enforcement officers are encouraged to obtain the consent in written form, 
expressly specifying the systems to be accessed.  
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Third parties may, under certain circumstances, grant consent for a search.  Under 
U.S. v. Matlock and subsequent cases, a private person who shares common authority or 
control over a computer may grant consent.  This usually includes the target’s spouse, 
may include the target’s roommate or co-workers, and usually does not include computer 
repairmen or government officials.  Password protection or encryption may defeat third 
party consent.   
 
The results of private searches may be shared with government officials after the 
fact, assuming no prior agency relationship.  Under U.S. v. Jacobsen, law enforcement 
officers may see what the private person saw, but no more.  This approach is very 
common in computer cases. 
 
Under U.S. v. Horton, items in plain view may be seized if their incriminating 
nature is immediately apparent.  U.S. v. Hall permits a computer to be seized (but not 
accessed) temporarily until a warrant issues, but U.S. v. Carey forbids searches based on 
nothing more than an opinion that the contents of a system are incriminating based 
merely on the filename and type. 
 
In U.S. v. David the Supreme Court held that exigent circumstances permit the 
seizure and search of a computer system to prevent the destruction of evidence. This 
exception is often applied to the volatile information stored in the pagers of criminal 
suspects.  This exception, however, lasts only as long as the exigency, and once the 
evidence is safely out of danger, a warrant is required for any subsequent search.   
 
A search incident to arrest (SITA) permits reasonable searches of a person and the 
electronic devices on his person (e.g., pagers, cell phones, and PDAs) at the time of 
arrest. 
 
 An inventory search is permitted following arrest for the non-investigatory 
purpose of establishing an accurate record of the suspect’s property.  Theses searches 
may yield evidence, but only if originally undertaken for the purpose of inventory.  In 
U.S. v. Flores, a case in the Southern District of New York, the court held that there was 
no legitimate non-investigatory purpose in searching the contents of a suspect’s cell 
phone—that a lawful inventory search would require no more than recording the presence 
of the cell phone, and not its contents. 
 
Warrantless searches are permitted at the U.S. border.  In U.S. v. Roberts, federal 
authorities set up a false inspection station at an airport in order to catch a suspect before 
his flight to Paris.  The court held that the thousands of child pornography images seized 




In the workplace, employees retain REP unless the objects or information are 
open to the world at large.  An employer may consent to the search of an employee’s 
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workspace.  In O’Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court established a unique test for 
public employment workplace searches.  If the workplace to be searched is “open to 
fellow employees or the public,” or if there are “actual office practices and procedures . . 
. or legitimate regulations” that permit a search, then there is no REP.   
 
The Fourth Circuit, in U.S. v. Simons, has held that a properly worded banner is 
sufficient to destroy REP.  One example of such a banner is:  “This is a government 
computer network.  You should have no expectation of privacy in your use of this 
computer.  Your use constitutes consent to monitoring.” 
 
A written employment policy may serve the same purpose.  In the absence of such 
a banner or policy, a public employment search may still be permissible (under 
O’Connor) if reasonable in scope and duration.  The search must be justified at its 
inception, reasonably related in scope and circumstances, and be conducted by employers 






The Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§2251-2522) forbids government interception of 
wire-based communications unless a specific exception applies.  Exceptions include: 
 
• Court Order 
o Probable cause that communication facility being used in crime, 
interception will reveal evidence of the predicate felony 
o Normal investigative techniques (subpoena, pen register, trap and 
trace, undercover agents, search warrants, surveillance, interviews 
and informants) have been tried and have failed, or would be 
unlikely to succeed 
• Consent  
o Granted by a party to the communication 
o Bannering, terms of service, or employment policies may provide 
constructive consent 
• Provider Protection  
o Monitoring must be done to protect the ISP’s rights or property 
(including intangible property) 
o Provider may give results of past monitoring to law enforcement; 
may not be tasked by law enforcement 
o Extent of this exception is not well defined 
• Computer Trespasser 
o Target has no contractual relationship with the government or 
authority to be on the computer, and 
                                                 
2 The material in this section is drawn from the work of Richard Salgado of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
and is contained in his 2003 presentation. 
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o ISP has authorized interception, and 
o Government does the monitoring, and 
o The interception is relevant to an ongoing investigation 
• Extension Telephone 
• Inadvertently Obtained 
• Accessible to Public 
 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) controls government access 
to stored communications and transactional records.  It provides criteria for voluntarily 
providing evidence to the federal government and a specific process to compel 
(nonvoluntary) production.  Voluntary disclosure by the ISP is permitted only when the 
service in question is offered “to the public.”  Precisely how much of the public to whom 
the service must be offered is still unsettled. 
 
Under ECPA, content receives more protection than non-content, and voicemail is 
treated identically to e-mail.  There are three types of process for obtaining this 
information: 
 
• Subpoena:  basic subscriber information 
• Court order:  2703(d) orders for above and transaction logs 
• Search warrant:  above plus content (unopened e-mails) 
 
As general rules, more process yields more information, and more process reduces the 
requirement to give advance notice to the subject. 
 
A 2703(d) order requires “ . . . specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that [the requested records] are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”  The order may include a directive to the provider not to 
disclose to subscriber.  The orders are effective nationwide, and may be issued by federal 
or state courts.  2703(d) orders may also be used in place of a subpoena to obtain 
communications not in electronic storage from a public provider, but prior notice must be 
given.  This notice mat be delayed, and may include a directive to provider not to disclose 
to subscriber. 
 
2703(f) request requires provider to preserve record for 90 days to allow law 
enforcement to seek proper authorization for search and seizure.  This duty extends only 
records in the provider’s possession at the time of the request, not future information.  
These requests may be extended. 
 
2702 governs voluntary disclosure prohibitions and exceptions.  A private 
provider may disclose all contents, whether retrieved or not, transactional data, and user 
information.  A public provider must follow the more narrow statutory exceptions: 
 
• Consent to disclose exists (e.g., banner) 
• To protect rights and property 
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• If contents are inadvertently obtained and pertain to the commission of a 
crime, or 
• If the provider reasonably believes an emergency involving immediate 
danger of death or serious bodily injury requires disclosure 
 
Violations of ECPA are remedied by civil damages only.  There is no suppression 
remedy for a non-constitutional violation. 
 
ECPA recognizes three broad types of evidence—basic subscriber information, 
transactional records, and content—and is structured around a series of dichotomies: 
 
• Content of communications v. non-content 
o Content:  retrieved e-mail v. non-retrieved 
 Retrieved e-mail:  held by public v. private provider 
• Public provider:  protected by ECPA requires notice 
to compel disclosure 
• Private provider:  normal subpoena; no notice 
required 
 Unretrieved e-mail:  stale (>180 days) v. fresh (<180 days) 
• Fresh, unretrieved content: requires search warrant 
o No notice to intended recipient is required 
o Non-content:  detailed transactional v. basic subscriber information 
 Basic subscriber information 
• Obtained through subpoena 
• Includes: 
o name and address  
o local and long distance telephone billing 
records 
o telephone number or username or screen 
name 
o length and type of service provided 
o session times and duration 
o temporarily assigned network address 
o means and source of payment  
 Other non-content 
• Includes: 
o Audit trails and logs 
o Identities of e-mail correspondents 
o Cell site data 




Entrapment is not the product of a specific stature, but is a legal defense in 
criminal prosecutions.  It does not apply in civil cases.  Entrapment has two requirements:  
The government must induce the illegal conduct, and the defendant must not have been 
  9 
predisposed to engage in the illegal conduct.  This two-part test is a difficult one for the 
defendant to prove, and is thus rarely successful. There are also numerous bases for civil 
liability in deploying honeypots.  Any reasonably foreseeable damage caused to an 
innocent party may provide grounds for a suit for monetary damages. 
 
For further information, the best single website on the criminal aspects of cyber 






Intelligence Collection is the simplest of the three legal approaches to cyber 
operations.  There is only one major test:  Is the target a U.S. person?  If the intruder is a 
U.S. citizen, a resident alien, a group with a substantial number of American members, or 
a U.S corporation, then the U.S. intelligence community has virtually no power to collect 
against him.  If, however, the target is a foreign national not falling into a protected 
category, there are remarkably few limitations on collection.  The laws and directives 
governing the intelligence community are scrupulously followed, in large part because of 
the aggressive oversight maintained by the cleared members and staff of the House and 
Senate intelligence committees.   
 
This paradigm offers great freedom for prompt and intrusive collection against 
those not protected by the U.S. Constitution.  The primary aim under this approach, 
however, is not immediate resolution, but maximum information collection.  An intruder 
may be left to his own devices indefinitely, in the hopes of learning as much as possible 
about him.  Questions would include:  What information is he seeking?  What techniques 
is he using?  Who is working with him?  What organization or government is supporting 
him?  Once the purely intelligence-gathering portion of the operation is mature, it may 
even be possible to launch a counter-intelligence operation, feeding him false information 
to act as a tracer, or to alter the adversary’s decision-making.  The weakness here, then, is 
that an intruder may “get away with it” for quite some time, and the Big Picture of the 
intelligence community may rationally demand that a few systems be compromised to 






The law governing the resort to and execution of military operations is the third 
major area of the law governing activities in cyberspace.  This last category has three 
distinct regimes, depending on the phase of any given conflict:  the law of peace (jus in 
pace), the law of conflict management (jus ad bellum), governing the transition from 
peace to war, and the law of war (jus in bello).  Before evaluating the efficacy of any 
policy choice, decision-makers must have sound, fact-based legal advice that is 
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connected to clearly articulated principles of law.  See generally Schmitt 1999 and 
Wingfield 2000. 
  
 Of central importance is the application of the law of armed conflict to the use of 
force by states in cyberspace once hostilities have commenced.  At a point along the 
spectrum of interstate activities called the line of belligerency, a use of force by a state 
establishes an international armed conflict as a matter of law and the law of armed 
conflict applies.  Even though the law of conflict management continues to apply during 
armed conflict, the law of armed conflict specifically authorizes a state to use all 
necessary and proportional force not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict 
that is required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. 
 
 The two principal questions facing military operators in cyberspace, then, are: 
 
(1)  which interstate activities in cyberspace constitute a threat or use of force 
under international law, and 
 
(2)  when such a threat or use of force does constitute an armed attack under 
international law, how does the law of armed conflict apply to the lawful exercise 
of the inherent right of self-defense in cyberspace? 
 
These questions are fundamental to the law of information conflict (LOIC), which is the 
composite of the peacetime regime of international law, the law of conflict management, 
and the law of armed conflict that regulates the conduct of all state activities in 
cyberspace.  It embodies the application of the entire peacetime regime as well as the 
entirety of the laws of conflict management and armed conflict to state activities in 
cyberspace.  
  
The first of these questions has been problematic for quite some time.  Until 
recently, the consensus among top legal scholars in the US and abroad was that a 
quantitative approach to cyber-warfare made the most sense.  That is, when evaluating 
whether an information operation rose to the level of a use of force or armed attack, one 
should disregard the means and focus exclusively on the ends.  Whether an oil refinery is 
set ablaze from a one-ton bomb or from a line of malicious computer code doesn’t matter.  
A flaming refinery, they concluded, is a flaming refinery.  Any cyber-attack that causes 
damage indistinguishable from a kinetic attack should be legally indistinguishable as 
well. 
 
There is, unfortunately, a catch—the UN Charter, the paradigmatic document of 
international law, takes a qualitative approach, not a quantitative one.  The framers, 
writing at the end of WWII, wanted to discourage military coercion, even at the cost of 
increasing diplomatic and economic coercion.  Deciding that even the most stiffly 
worded diplomatic note—or restrictive economic boycott—would be preferable to an 
armored division crashing across an international border, the framers incorporated a very 
low threshold for impermissible military activity and a very high threshold for 
nonmilitary activity.  The problem with this approach, as the subsequent decades have 
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shown, is that many forms of “nonmilitary” coercion—such as terrorism and so called 
“low intensity conflicts”—result in more death and destruction than many traditional 
military activities, and many of today’s information weapons look nothing like military 
weapons and technology of the past.  Sixty years ago, a telegraph message was simply a 
means of communication, benign and unassuming.  Perhaps today—and certainly in the 
future—its e-mail equivalent could carry a virus capable of wreaking just the sort of 
havoc described above.  
 
Policy makers can overcome this intellectual and legal quandary by adhering to a 
forward-looking doctrine known as the “Schmitt Analysis.”  By demonstrating how 
military coercion differs from diplomatic and economic coercion, Michael Schmitt, late 
of Yale, the Naval War College, and now at the Marshall Center in Europe, identified 
seven areas—severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive 
legitimacy, and responsibility—in which military operations differ qualitatively from 
nonmilitary ones.  If any given operation were quantitatively “graded” in each of these 
seven areas, the results could be used to give a principled qualitative description of the 
operation, accurately classifying it as a use of force or not.  In short, the quantitative input 
suggested by the world’s leading scholars on the topic would yield the qualitative output 
required for a proper characterization under the UN Charter.   
This analysis has the added advantage of requiring attorneys and their clients to make 
conscious, documented assessments of each facet of a proposed operation, educating 
them in an otherwise subjective, opaque, and often incomplete ad hoc analysis. This is as 
true of planning an offensive operation as it is of analyzing, and reacting lawfully to, an 
attack in which we are the victims. 
 
How specifically should decision-makers use this information to think more 
clearly about ordering such operations?  Here are the dyads they should keep in mind: 
 
 Severity:  If people are killed or there is extensive property damage, the 
action is probably military; the less damage, the less likely the action is a 
“use of force.” 
 Immediacy:  When the effects are seen within seconds to minutes—such 
as when a bomb explodes—the operation is probably military; if the 
effects take weeks or months to appear, it is more likely diplomatic or 
economic. 
 Directness:  If the action taken is the sole cause of the result, it is more 
likely to be viewed as a use of force; as the link between cause and effect 
attenuates, so does the military nature of the act. 
 Invasiveness:  A violated border is still an indicator of military operations; 
actions that are mounted from outside a target nation’s borders are 
probably more diplomatic or economic. 
 Measurability:  If the effect can be quantified immediately—such as 
photographing a “smoking hole” where the target used to be—the 
operation has a strong military characteristic; the more subjective the 
process of evaluating the damage, the more diplomatic or economic. 
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 Presumptive Legitimacy:  State actors have a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of kinetic force, while other non-kinetic actions—attacks through or in 
cyberspace— often are permissible in a wider set of circumstances; 
actions that have not been the sole province of nation-states are less likely 
to be viewed as military 
 Responsibility:  If a state takes visible responsibility for any destructive 
act, it is more likely to be categorized as a traditional military operation; 
ambiguous responsibility militates for a non-military label.   
 
The Schmitt Analysis lends itself to partial automation, and several articles have 
been published on the topic.  See Farkas, et al., 2004.   
 
Once the determination has been made that a state of de facto hostilities do exist 
and the law of armed conflict does apply, the analysis turns to the four central principles 
of the law of war:  discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and chivalry. 
 
The principle of discrimination requires that, prior to any use of force, the 
attacker distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, between military objectives 
and civilian objects.  Noncombatants include civilians and “protected persons,” such as 
medics and chaplains.  While it is unlawful to attack civilian objects as such, it is not 
unlawful to collaterally damage civilian objects located so close to lawful military 
objectives that no reasonable precautions could have prevented the damage.  In 
cyberspace, such distinctions will require the collection and analysis of information to 
produce the intelligence required to make such determinations.  The military commander 
must consider foreseeable secondary effects in his target selection and mission planning. 
 
The principle of necessity permits the use of all force required for mission 
accomplishment and force protection, but not superfluous force or unnecessary suffering.  
Superfluous force is that which is inflicted solely for the sake of causing damage.  
Unnecessary suffering has two components:  quantitatively, it is simply the complement 
of military necessity (necessary force); qualitatively, it includes those means and methods 
of war that are by nature inhumane (chemical weapons, biological weapons, exploding 
bullets, transparent bullets which cannot be detected in the body by x-ray equipment). 
 
The principle of proportionality requires the military commander to balance the 
collateral damage (against civilians and their property) of a planned attack against the 
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.  Proportionality is not the 
requirement to respond with only as much force as was used in the precipitating attack, 
and is not the requirement to employ the same means and methods as in the provoking 
attack.  Whatever other policy preferences may be expressed later in the national security 
decision-making process, the basic legal requirement is to ensure the balance of military 
advantage gained outweighs the damage done to noncombatants and their property.   
 
The principle of chivalry permits ruses of war, but forbids perfidy.  Perfidy is 
unlawfully deceiving an opponent that he is entitled to enjoy, or required to accord, 
protections of law, which are, in fact, inapplicable in the situation.  Attacking an enemy 
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facility from a vehicle displaying the Red Cross or the U.N. flag would be examples of 
perfidiously deceiving the enemy into according protections under law (not attacking the 
vehicle) which are not applicable.  Broadcasting a false notice of cease-fire or calling for 
a parlementaire before attacking the unwary opponent would be an example of 
perfidiously deceiving one’s opponent that he is entitled to a protection of law, which in 
fact, he is not.  Ruses of war, on the other hand, are legal.  They are wartime deceptions 
that convince an enemy to launch or withhold an attack based on tactical reasons, rather 
than perceived legal reasons.  
 
Treaty law reflects the four basic principles of discrimination, necessity, 
proportionality, and chivalry, described above, codifying and implementing customary 
international law.  They occasionally lead international law by affirmatively proposing 
new norms and standards, at first applicable to only those nations which sign the 
agreements.  Such new standards may become binding on other nations over time, if 
those other nations adopt the new norms, and do so out of a sense of legal obligation.  
Treaties applicable to an earlier age or a different type of warfare may nonetheless be 
useful in charting the course of the law of information conflict, to the extent that 
analogies may be drawn from them and applied to operations in cyberspace.  
 
In addition to treaty law, there is another legal dimension, based on the various 
geographical regimes implicated by a contemplated course of action.  The principle areas 
are the law of the sea, air law, space law, and foreign domestic (or host nation) law.  The 
law of the sea addresses the metaphor of “innocent passage” in cyberspace, unauthorized 
broadcasting, and liability for damage done in wartime.  Air law covers the metaphor of 
defining airspace (as applied to defining cyberspace), the legal restrictions on interfering 
with aircraft communications or navigation, as well as physical attacks on aircraft.  Space 
law is useful in the distinction of air and space, the use of space platform for peaceful and 
non-peaceful purposes, and the liability of those who cause damage against or through 
the use of space platforms.  Foreign domestic law is most applicable in the area of 
stationing arrangements and the limitations they place on the employment of weapons 
and forces forward deployed. 
 
Finally, in the international arena, there is the rapidly-developing law of 
Computer Network Espionage (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA), which are 
located on two places along the spectrum of conflict, and have distinctly different legal 
characteristics.  Computer Network Espionage, like any form of pure espionage, is lawful 
under international law, but is usually not lawful under the domestic law of the target 
state.  CNE usually involves little or no force, and involves only as much intrusion as is 
necessary to collect the required information from the adversary’s systems.  Computer 
Network Attack, on the other hand, involves some kind of destruction with consequences 
in the physical world.  CNA should be analyzed as any other type of use of force, and, 
depending on the scope, duration, and intensity of the force employed, may rise to the 
level of an armed attack.  
 
While these questions are almost exclusively within the field of international law, 
the War on Terror has raised questions regarding the domestic aspects of military 
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operations—specifically, the proper delineation of homeland security from homeland 
defense.  In general terms, homeland defense is the domestic use of military forces 
against foreign enemies, and homeland security includes most everything else.  This 
distinction is captured in the long-enduring but poorly understood doctrine of posse 
comitatus.  Under the current understanding of the doctrine, the military is forbidden to 
act domestically in a law enforcement capacity vis-à-vis U.S. citizens, but may perform 
traditional military missions against foreign enemies on U.S. soil.  The scope and 
pedigree of this doctrine are complex and are often applied more as a matter of policy 
than law.  A comprehensive treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this learning 
module, but the definitive article on the topic, Felicetti and Luce (2003), is currently 
available. 
 
Given the complexity of the law governing this new area of operations, it is 
vitally important that policymakers and their legal advisers share a common intellectual 








Honey pots, honey nets, and decoys have received a great deal of attention in 
recent years as a means for diverting, containing, and studying cyber intrusions.  Several 
articles stand out as excellent introductions to the legal, policy, and technical 
considerations in developing, testing, deploying, and operating cyber decoys.  See 
generally Auguston, et al., 2002; Michael 2002; Michael and Riehle 2001; Michael and 
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